While there has been considerable interest in recent years in the role of macroeconomic determinants of antidumping actions by the US and other traditional users, on the one hand, and the determinants of the growing global usage of this trade policy instrument, on the other, there has to date been no systematic exploration of the motivations for the significant number of foreign antidumping cases filed against US exporters. Several observers have remarked that the growing number of foreign users of antidumping might threaten US exporters, but the determinants of these actions have not been examined. That is the purpose of the following study. We find that these actions are in part explained by macroeconomic forces and as a response to US export superiority in particular sectors, however a significant role (and larger than found for global antidumping more generally) is played by retaliation for US trade policy actions.
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I. Some Patterns and a Literature Review
While the EU and the US continue to be major users of antidumping laws, this type of "administrative protection" against imports has become very widespread, with 39 other WTO-member countries (plus some non-members) initiating antidumping cases over the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] 
II. Data and Hypotheses
We utilize WTO data on the antidumping filings of all member countries against the United States in particular industry categories between 1995 and 2003. 5 In this research, the "industry category" is defined as one of 20 Harmonized System (HS)
sections, although we limit our data sample to the 14 sections in which at least one antidumping petition was filed against the United States during the sample period. To avoid any selection bias, the dataset includes 39 WTO member countries with active antidumping enforcement during this time period, although only 19 of these countries filed antidumping cases against the United States. 6 In order to observe a one year lag in filings to account for possible retaliation motivations, we limit our sample to the 1996 to 2003 period; the final dataset includes 4,312 observations. At least one antidumping petition was filed in 2.4 percent of these observations.
To study the determinants of the decision to file an antidumping petition against the United States, we estimate a population-averaged probit model in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a particular country filed at least one antidumping petition against a particular industry in the United States in the year in question. The model accounts for correlations across years in particular country-industry combinations by adjusting the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters. Marginal effects from this method can be interpreted as the average effect across the entire sample of a one unit change in the independent variables of interest on the probability that a particular country will file a petition against a particular industry in the United States. Alternatively, the marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the proportion of observations filing antidumping petitions due to a change in the independent variable.
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Our primary interest in this paper is to investigate whether antidumping actions against US exporters can be explained in part as retaliation for earlier antidumping 6 Members are the only countries required to report their antidumping filings to the WTO, therefore the dataset may underestimate the number of petitions filed by new WTO members prior to joining. We therefore exclude Taiwan from the data sample, and include China only after its inclusion in the WTO in 2000. 7 We also estimate parameters using a random-effects probit model, which explicitly accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across country and industry combinations by including a country-industry specific, normally-distributed error with a mean of zero and a constant variance. The results were qualitatively similar to those presented here. Estimation of a fixed-effects probit model, which suffers from the incidental parameters problem, was not feasible given the size of the sample. This research also investigates whether the macroeconomic factors that researchers have found to be important determinants in US filings are equally as important in the likelihood that foreign countries will target US exporters in antidumping actions. For example, both Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2006) find that countries are more likely to file antidumping petitions following a real appreciation of a country's currency or a fall in the country's GDP growth, at least in four of the traditional users of antidumping regulations, the United States, Australia, EU and Canada.
Intuitively, both of these factors make it more likely that the government will find that the domestic industry has been injured by imports from the targeted country and therefore more likely that the antidumping petition will be successful. To account for these macroeconomic determinants, we include the lagged log bilateral real exchange rate (EXCHANGE) and real GDP growth (GDPGROWTH). 9 The real GDP growth variable is the 3-year growth rate, or the three years prior to the filing date.
Finally, we include year-specific fixed effects to control for macroeconomic conditions in the United States which may result in an increase in antidumping actions against US exporters.
III. Results
Marginal effects associated with the population-averaged probit model are presented in Table 1 . Specification 1 attempts to decompose the retaliation effect into an industry-specific (CAT) and the country-level (OTHER) retaliation. The marginal effects indicate that while there is no evidence that individual industries choose to retaliate, retaliation does occur on a country-level. Specifically, countries are on average 1.7 9 We calculate the real bilateral exchange rate using nominal exchange rate and consumer price index data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics. We normalize each series by dividing by its sample mean prior to taking logs. The real GDP growth variable is calculated from data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
percentage points more likely to file an antidumping petition against an industry within the United States if the US targeted it in an antidumping action the previous year. This represents a 100 percent increase in the predicted probability of filing against the United
States.
Given that the estimates suggest that retaliation occurs at the country-level rather that at the industry level, the other two specifications in Table 1 combine the industryspecific and country-specific retaliation variables into a single retaliation variable.
Results from Specification 2 are similar to those in Specification 1-countries are 1.8
percentage points more likely to file against an industry within the United States if the US targeted it in an antidumping action the previous year. This result does not seem to be driven by antidumping petitions filed in the steel industry, as indicated by the results in Specification 3.
Comparing these results to those in Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) , retaliation appears to play a larger role in a country's decision to file antidumping actions against the United States compared to other target countries. Unfortunately, the estimates from this research are not directly comparable to those presented in Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) due to differences in methodology. Therefore, we replicate the populationaveraged probit model using the full sample of antidumping cases filed against the 72 exporting countries used in Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) . 10 The results indicate that a country is 0.59 percentage points more likely to file a petition against any country that targeted it with an antidumping action the previous year, considerably less than the 1.8
percentage point increase in the likelihood of filing against the United States.
Of course, because the United States tends to use antidumping regulations more often than many other countries, it is not surprising that cases filed against the United
States are in retaliation for an earlier US action than those aimed at other countries.
Retaliation was a possible motivation in 30.2 percent of observations in the US subsample, compared to only 3.6 percent of observations involving the 72 exporting countries in the full sample (i.e., the mean value of the retaliation dummy variable is considerably higher for the US subsample).
To further investigate the significance of retaliation in the level of antidumping protection against US exporters, we simulate what would happen to actions targeting US exporters if the United States eliminated its own antidumping enforcement. Using the coefficient estimates from the model, we estimate the probability that each country will file at least one antidumping petition against particular US industries in a given year. The probability that individual countries will file against a particular industry ranges from 0.07 percent to 46.0 percent. By summing these probabilities, we find that the model predicts at least 100 cases filed against the United States between 1996 and 2003.
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Recalculating these probabilities assuming that the United States had no antidumping enforcement during this time period, thus eliminating any possible retaliation motives, we find that the number of antidumping petitions filed against the United States would have fallen to 76-a decrease of over 25 percent.
As noted above, we expected countries to be less likely to file antidumping petitions against the United States if the US was one of its leading trading partners due to fear of retaliation. However, the marginal effect from the deterrence variable (DETER) is insignificant. All other estimates, however, are significant and of the expected sign.
Not surprisingly, the likelihood of filing an antidumping petition against a particular industry within the United States increases with the level of imports from that industry.
A one billion dollars increase in imports (IMPORTS) increases the probability of filing by 0.13 percentage points, or 7.8 percent.
Similarly, the estimates also provide evidence to support the hypothesis that the increase in global antidumping activity may be self-perpetuating. The likelihood that a country will file an antidumping action against the United States in a particular industry increases 0.03 percentage points, or 16.7 percent, with each antidumping case filed against the same industry in other countries the previous year (DEFLECT). This may be due to the fact that these earlier cases result in a surge of exports of a particular product to the importing country, prompting the importing country to impose new antidumping protection.
As found in previous research as well, we see that macroeconomic determinants have a significant impact on the likelihood that a country will file an antidumping petition against the United States. A one percent decrease in the importing country's three-year GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH) increases the likelihood of filing an antidumping petition against the United States by 0.07 percentage points, or 40 percent. A real appreciation of the importing country's currency also increases the likelihood of filing an antidumping petition against the United States.
IV. Conclusions
Our results confirm earlier findings explaining antidumping usage (both for the US and more generally) by macroeconomic forces and export flows in particular sectors.
However a significant role (and larger than found for global antidumping more generally) seems to be played by retaliation for US trade policy actions. We have not performed any welfare calculations to judge the societal impact, though there is a general consensus among economists that consumer costs from antidumping policy exceed gains to domestic producers (and their workers) of "like products". It seems likely that the additional costs imposed on exporters identified here will tip the balance still further against antidumping enforcement. 
